architecture with flexible support for instrumentation of At the heart of this problem is the static nature of sensors on compute systems. site security mechanisms. Site security mechanisms
The management system coordinates the prevention, cannot today change in time to respond to these quickly detection, and response mechanisms for the site. To emerging strong threats. Our approach, Mithril, prevent attacks it establishes policies for (1) firewalls, (2) introduces a new paradigm for site security, one based on network-based and host-based IDSs, (3) authentication the notion of survivability. Mithril provides the ability for and authorization mechanisms, and (4) (optionally) a site to raise its level of security dynamically in response commonly used applications that prevent adversaries to these ephemeral threats. This will allow a site to keep from attacking the site successfully. To detect attacks it an acceptable level of security during normal day-to-day includes an alert correlation engine that allows for operations, but respond quickly to sudden increased specification and detection of complex attacks. To threats. Following the notion of survivability, we will respond to attacks it modifies the policies of IDSs, allow this response to take place in a manner such that the authentication and authorization mechanisms, and increased security and resulting reduced usability will applications via cfengine (http.//www.cfengine.org), happen in a graceful manner, as opposed to today where
which is an open-source adaptive configuration engine.
the site is stuck between providing service at a set level of The response mechanisms are collated under simple security or taking itself off the net. security levels (normal, high, critical, etc.) that can be Mithril's design towards survivability is based on triggered via a simple user interface. the development of security mechanisms that prevent, In addition to the development of the management detect, and respond to specific threats and are coordinated system we have focused our work on two specific threats by a core management system. The result of applying the that were highlighted in Incident 216, namely, account Mithril solution is that sites will be able to survive during compromise via password stealing and email compromise via account and mail server compromise. 
HIDS). It is also built upon the premise that existing IDS
In a typical brute force correlation, alerts are picked configurations could integrate into such a hybrid up by the Prelude sensors and are then sorted by framework. It is fairly straightforward to wrap existing correlation filters to determine which alerts are third-party sensors so that they communicate with Prelude considered triggers. In a brute force attack, these triggers are failed attempts on an SSH logon. These alerts are Users associate their public keys with their remote generated by analyzing the authorization log file using the accounts, allowing them to authenticate with their Prelude log file analyzer (Prelude LML). Once a corresponding private keys for secure remote login. Users correlation filter has been 'triggered', an active are encouraged to protect their private keys by encrypting correlation is instantiated. This correlation is built using them with a passphrase. Then, to provide single sign-on, specific criteria and waits for prerequisites to be filled. In users can unlock/decrypt and load their private keys into this case, we are watching for a rate of attack. If a certain an SSH agent at the start of their session, and the SSH number of alerts are generated for login attempts within a client will forward authentication challenges to the agent certain time period, the active correlation reaches its for signing. Furthermore, as illustrated in Figure 1 , the threshold. At this point, it is considered an attack. agent connection can be forwarded over the SSH Response to an attack is undertaken via enforcement transport layer protocol, allowing users to initiate multiof security policies that are managed by the 'policyhop remote logins with single sign-on. Forwarding all manager' portion of the 'mithril-engine'. It is designed so authentication challenges to the agent minimizes exposure that policies can be customized dynamically and can be of the user's unencrypted private key during the session, enforced either automatically or by human intervention.
as the key is held in the agent's private memory and never convenience) avoid using the SSH agent altogether by storing their private keys unencrypted on disk, where they 4.1. SSH Remote Agent can be stolen if the user's account is compromised. The convenience for users of single sign-on unfortunately also Remote login is a core service provided by many provides convenience for attackers in propagating their collaborative computing sites. Allowing direct login attacks using compromised private keys. A recent study access to a site's computing platforms is often essential found that over 60% of users' SSH private keys were for providing a general-purpose service and allowing stored unencrypted and described how attacks were users to compile and tune their own codes for what are propagated via SSH in Incident 216 [11] often specialized computing platforms. Single sign-on Unfortunately, when an SSH private key is eases the integration of remote computing platforms into compromised, it is difficult to contain the breach. A the user's environment, avoids the need for users to user's public key may be associated with accounts at sites remember multiple passwords for different sites and across the Internet. In contrast to keys in PKI certificates, avoids the need for users to respond to an ongoing series these keys have no lifetime restrictions or revocation of password prompts during distributed computing capability. The compromised public keys must be sessions. disassociated with each remote account. SSH public key authentication [10] is a widely used standard for secure remote login with single sign-on.
To address this vulnerability, we have developed an discuss and coordinate a response. In Incident 216 the SSH Remote Agent illustrated in Figure 2 . Rather than email system was attacked (both as the client side and at storing SSH private keys on a user's desktop, where they the server side) with a specific goal of eavesdropping on are vulnerable to many attacks, the SSH Remote Agent discussions on the coordinated response. To address this provides a mechanism for generating and storing keys on threat we have developed SELS, a Secure Email List a dedicated, secured key server. By running the sshService [2] [4] that provides confidentiality, integrity, and remote-agent program, users authenticate and establish a authentication for messages exchanged over a mailing secure connection to the key server at the start of their list. session, and all SSH public key authentication challenges Encryption and signing with digital certificates as are forwarded to the key server via the SSH agent done in PGP and S/MIME for secure two party email forwarding protocol, so the user private keys need never suffices to address the client-side threat. However, leave the key server. Our approach is similar to the extending such solutions for mailing lists would expose MyProxy systems [12] , which protect long-lived private email plaintext at the list server. SELS uses proxy keys in a dedicated repository and issue short-lived X.509 encryption techniques to ensure that messages remain proxy certificates [ . We now give a brief overview of how administrators, machines with sensors that detect attacks, SELS ensures security of emails exchanged in a list as and machines with actuators that respond to attacks. illustrated in Figure 3 . Here a mailing list has been setup These entities need to communicate with each other in to include a sensor and an administrator among other list order to keep the site secure and email is the most members. All list members have received a list public common form of such communications. Specifically, encryption key, PKLK, signature keys (e.g., SKs for the mailing lists are setup that allow devices to send messages sensor), signature verification keys (e.g., PKs for the to a set of administrators and allows the administrators to sensor), and decryption keys (e.g., SKA for the administrator). In addition the list server has a deploy and test our system's effectiveness on NCSA's corresponding private key for every member that is uses compute infrastructure. We will also continue to develop for proxy transformations (e.g., K'A for the administrator).
and integrate tools that address foreseeable threats to In order to send a message to the list, the sensor open computing sites. signs the email message and then encrypts the signed message with a randomly generated symmetric key k. The 7. References sensor then encrypts k with the list public key and sends this message to the list server. The list server then
[1] M. Atighetchi, P. Pal, C. Jones, P. Rubel, R. Schantz, processes the encrypted key part of the message J. Loyall, and J. Zinky, "Building Auto-Adaptive separately for every recipient by applying proxy 
